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DUNS SCOTUS ON ETERNITY AND TIMELESSNESS
Richard Cross

Scotus consistently holds that eternity is to be understood as timelessness. In
his early Lectura, he criticizes Aquinas' account of eternity on the grounds
that (1) it entails collapsing past and future into the present, and (2) it entails
a B-theory of time, according to which past, present and future are all ontologically on a par with each other. Scotus later comes to accept something
like Aquinas' account of God's timelessness and the B-theory of time which it
entails. Scotus also offers a refutation of his earlier argument that Aquinas'
account of eternity entails collapsing past and future into the present.

In this paper, I want to establish two conclusions. The main one will be
that Scotus has a conception of eternity as timelessness. For an entity to
be timeless, I mean that it lacks both temporal extension and temporal
succession. The second is that, despite the fact that in one early passage
Scotus explicitly criticizes Aquinas, their positions are not as diverse as
commentators have supposed. Both of these claims are against the
received wisdom concerning Scotus' position, but I will try to give good
reasons for accepting them. I shall first give an account of the Thomist
claim which Scotus criticizes, together with Scotus' criticism. In the second section of this paper, I shall outline Scotus' standard position on
timelessness. In the third section I shall show that Scotus' position is
very close to Aquinas'. In a final section, I will summarize my findings,
and suggest two difficulties with Scotus' proposed account. I will also
try to show what contemporary relevance Scotus' account might have. 1
Some textual considerations need to be borne in mind, since there
seems to me to be some evidence that Scotus changed his mind on the
matter, and came to see that his earlier position was inconsistent. In
what follows, I shall make use of two different versions of Scotus' commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. The earlier of these is the
Lectura, the relevant parts of which date from before 1300. 2 My main
source will be the Ordinatio: Scotus' final edited version of his commentary. Dating this work is difficult. We know that Scotus was working
on it as early as 1300, and that it remained incomplete at the time of his
death in 1308.3 Nevertheless, we can reliably take it as the most important version to survive.
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Faith and Philosophy
I. Scotus' criticism of Aquinas in Lectura, book 1, distinction 39

In a famous rassage inspired by Boethius, Aquinas claims that God
can know future contingents since
(A) All temporal things are eternally present to God:
I would argue that (A) provides good evidence that Aquinas holds God
to be timeless. Whether or not Aquinas did hold God to be timeless is
still a matter for dispute, however, and I will not discuss it here. s There
seem to me to be good reasons for supposing Aquinas' God to be timeless, and I shall assume, for the purposes of my paper, that Aquinas has
a conception of divine timelessness. However (A) is construed, it seems
prima facie to be open to an objection which has been clearly articulated
by Anthony Kenny:
The whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is
simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically incoherent. For simultaneity as ordinarily understood is a transitive
relation. If A happens at the same time as B, and B happens at
the same time as C, then A happens at the same time as C. If the
BBC programme and the lTV programme both start when Big
Ben strikes ten, then they both start at the same time. But, on St
Thomas' view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the
whole of eternity. Again, on his view, the great fire of Rome is
simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type
these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on. 6
Although he does not point this out, Kenny's inference here will only be
valid if simultaneity is both transitive and symmetrical. Presumably,
Kenny would regard the symmetry of a relation of simultaneity to be so
obvious as not to need spelling out.
William Lane Craig has raised a weaker related objection to Aquinas'
account. Craig argues, on the basis of his account of God's knowledge,
that Aquinas must be a "proponent of the B-theory of time," accepting
that "the past, present, and future are all ontologically on a par with
each other."7 Craig's point is rather different from Kenny's, since I take
it that it would be possible to hold a B-theory of time without accepting
that past and future will collapse into the present.
In book 1, distinction 39 of the Lectura, Scotus criticizes Aquinas'
claim (A). Unfortunately, Scotus' later Ordinatio remains incomplete at
this point, and the scribe notes that Scotus left a blank space to fill in the
discussion later - presumably when he had worked out what he wanted to say on the matter.8 To make up for this deficiency, the scribe
copied another version of the relevant discussion, a version which the
Vatican editors regard as at best only dubiously authentic - possibly
reconstructed by a disciple of Scotus' from lost notebooks, but certainly
not representing Scotus' last thoughts on the matter. 9 Two of the arguments Scotus uses in the Lectura are relevant here. (A'.n Accepting
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(B) If x is present to y, then both x and yexist,
and
(C) It is not the case that the whole of flowing time exists,
Scotus concludes that (A) is false.lO By "exist," Scotus must mean something like "exist now," or "be present." He makes this clear by contrasting the sense of "exist" he has in mind with "merely secundum quid existence": existence qualified in some way or another. To spell out the relevant qualification, Scotus draws an analogy with space. God cannot be
present to a place which exists merely potentially; neither can he be present to a time (the future) which exists merely potentially.l1 Granted
this, we can replace (B) and (C) with
(B*) If x is present to y, then both x and yare present,
and
(C*) It is not the case that the whole of flowing time is present.
The argument is that (A) will entail the falsity of (C*): and I take it that
the falsity of (C*) would in turn entail
(1) All things are temporally present,

which in turn entails that all temporal things are simultaneous. (Scotus'
second argument - [A'.21 - provides a good reason for rejecting [1].)
Thus, (A'.!) is just a less rigorous variation of Kenny's argument against
Aquinas, and anyone accepting (A'.I) will be committed to the transitivity and symmetry of relations of simultaneity or presence. 12
(A' .2) (A) entails
(1 *) All things are actual.

But Scotus holds that
(D) Only temporally present things are actual,
and hence that (A) entails
(1) All things are temporally present.

But (1) is false, since coupled with
(E) What is actual at one time cannot be produced in actuality
for the first time at a later time,
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it entails the absurd conclusion
(2) Nothing will be produced in actuality in the future.
Therefore 0), and hence (A), are to be rejected. 13 The significant point
here is that rejecting (D) - as Aquinas will have to - will entail holding
a B-theory of time: and accepting (D) will entail rejecting a B-theory of
time. Much the same point is made by Marilyn Adams:
Aquinas is presupposing an ontology according to which everything that has any temporal location is timelessly given "in its own
determinate existence," so that there is no difference in ontological
status among past, present, and future things .... In advancing
premiss 2 [i.e., (D)], Scotus is implicitly rejecting such an ontology
in favor of one in which only the timeless and those temporal
things that are temporally present are absolutely actual. 14
Thus, Scotus' two arguments provide two different reasons for the
rejection of Aquinas' position. (A'.l) trades on the transitivity and symmetry of relations of simultaneity. It thus rejects the Thomist entailment,
pointed out by Kenny, that past, present and future are all simultaneous.
(A'.2) exploits the claim made in (0), and rejects the B-theory of time
entailed by Aquinas' theory. William Lane Craig suggests further that
(A'.l) entails that
God is eternal only in that He is everlasting and exists at every
temporal "now."IS
I do not see just how (A'.I) entails the claim that God is everlasting,
though I think I see how drawing this inference would be tempting. For
example, we might draw this inference if we thought that the falsity of
(A) entailed that God is successively present to successive temporal
items. But I do not see that the falsity of (A) entails this: and, as we shall
see, Scotus clearly denies elsewhere that God is successively present to
successive temporal items. In what follows I shall try to show that there
is plenty of evidence against the claim that Scotus' God is eternal in the
sense of being everlasting.
On the showing in book 1, distinction 39 of the Lectura, Scotus clearly
rejects the Thomist position: though the account leaves unclear whether
or not Scotus would hold God to be timeless. But elsewhere in both the
Lectura and the Ordinatio, Scotus makes claims which are far more akin
to the Thomist view which he rejects in book 1, distinction 39 of the
Lectura. As I have already noted, Scotus' Ordinatio lacks distinction 39 of
book 1: this lack seems to me to be initial evidence that Scotus came to
perceive that his rejection of the Thomist position in the Lectura is inconsistent with other claims which he makes in the Lectura, and which since he repeats them in the Ordinatio - he clearly does not wish to
abandon. In what follows, I shall argue that Scotus accepts the Thomist
position with regard to timelessness, despite his rogue arguments in
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book I, distinction 39 of the Lectura. I shall refer to "5cotus' standard
position" to indicate the position taken everywhere except book I, distinction 39 of the Lectura. There is good evidence that Scotus rejects
(A'.l) and (A'.2) in the Ordinatio, and that he should have rejected them
even in the Lectura. As we shall see, Scotus' rejection of (A'.l) does not
entail a commitment to the falsity of (C*). Equally, rejecting (A'.2)
allows him to accept Aquinas' claim (or something like it) that God can
have knowledge of his creatures in their actual existence, irrespective of
whether those creatures are now future. 1o But I shall also argue that the
way in which Scotus rejects (A'.2) will commit him to a B-theory of time.
We should also bear in mind, however, that Scotus says a great deal
about time which falls outside the parameters of his discussion of eternity. I hope to explore in a later paper some of what Scotus says expressly
about time. Briefly, it seems to me that Scotus has an account of time in
which the B-series is fundamental. His account clearly allows a place for
A-series time, and he does not regard the past, present and future as in
every sense "on a par with each other." But he has difficulty spelling
out just what his account of the A-series will be, since he consistently
rejects any attempt to give an account of the A-series in terms of a flowing "now."!7

II. Scotus' position on etem ity and timelessness
In his most important discussion of eternity, Scotus quotes with
approval the well-known Boethian definition:
Eternity is endless life, possessed perfectly and all at once.!B
On this definition, as construed by 5cotus, eternity has, topologically,
the properties of an instant. Like an instant, it is "all at once," 19 a property which 5cotus takes as excluding temporal succession. 20 Scotus is
rightly quite clear that an instant has zero temporal extension. 21 Scotus
does not suppose, however, that eternity is in every respect like a temporal instant. Unlike an instant, it does not cease immediately: but this, I
take it, is not to ascribe some topological property to eternity, since the
point which Scotus wishes to make is that eternity is not the boundary of
some temporally extended continuum. To underscore this point, Scotus
talks of the "now" of eternity "remaining,"n having "duration"23 and, in
Boethian fashion, being "endless."24 But this again would not be taken
by Scotus to have any topological implications. Specifically, Scotus is
quite clear that time is a continuum which is necessarily bounded by
instants: and an enduring eternal "now" will fail to satisfy this condition
for temporality.25
It might be objected that Scotus is merely using language from an
established Boethian and neo-Platonic tradition here, without the use of
this language implying that Scotus really thinks that God is timeless.
After all, he clearly holds that eternity has duration: and at one point he
refers to it as "endless duration."26 In reply, I would offer three arguments. First, Scotus has a clear conception of the topological differences
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between an instant and a temporal continuum, and that it is reasonable
to suppose that he has these differences in mind when likening eternity
to an instant.
Secondly, my claim that Scotus conceives of eternity as timelessness is
strengthened by the way in which Scotus deals with two problems: (i)
Does God's timeless willing of some effect entail that the effect is timeless? (ii) Did God have to wait for the creation of the universe? With
regard to the first of these questions, Scotus argues as follows:
A new effect can be made by an old act of the will without a
change of will. Just as I, by means of my continuous volition by
which I will something to be done, will then do it just for the
"when" for which I will to do it, so God in eternity willed something other than himself to be for some time and then created it
for the "when" for which he willed it to be. 27
Equally, the fact that a creature is created at t does not entail that God
has to do anything at t. All God has to do is to will (eternally) that the
creature is created at t. Thus, there can be a new effect without any
change in the cause. 2B
This account, although suggestive of my point, is admittedly consistent both with a timeless God and with an immutable everlasting God.
But Scotus' treatment of the second question is not. According to Scot us,
God did not have to wait for the creation of the universe. First, God did
not have to wait before deciding to create the universe. Thus, he did not
wait and then start willing something. The reason for this is that God's
willing is timeless. But more important is Scotus' assertion that God did
not have to wait for the effect:
[God's] will is not impotent; neither does it have existence in
time, such that it would wait for the time for which it produces
what it wills. It does not will this [willed thing] then to exist
necessarily when it wills. Rather, it wills [it] to exist for some
determined time - for which, however, it does not wait, since
the operation of [God's] will is not in time. 29
Not having to wait for any effect - whatever the effect's temporallocation - entails being timeless.
Thirdly, Scotus clearly holds that time is necessarily relative to
change: if there were no change, there would be no time. 3D Scotus makes
this point as though merely metrical considerations were at stake: if
there were no natural processes, then we would not be able to assign a
measurable duration to any existing state of affairs. Richard Swinburne
has pointed out that such a claim does not entail the further claim that, if
there were no natural processes, there would be no temporal extension
at all. On Swinburne's account, there could be temporal extension but
no measurable duration. 31 Scotus' account, however, is not quite like
this: and it is clear that Scotus would regard his account of time as having topological implications, despite the (Aristotelian) way in which he
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phrases the point. As just noted, temporal extension is defined by
Scotus as a linear continuum bounded by instants. Independent of questions of metric, it is for Scotus a necessary feature of temporal extension
that it have such a topology. Scotus' eternity, however, fails to satisfy
this topological description. When he claims that time is the measure of
change, and that time is necessarily relative to change, I therefore take it
that he is denying any kind of Newtonian absolute time. Scotus is
claiming that, in the absence of any change whatsoever, there would be
nothing which exhibited any of the topological properties of time. (It
will of course follow as a matter of fact on this account that there is no
temporal topology without a temporal metric, granted that the existence
of natural processes is a sufficient condition for the existence of a temporal metric.)32
This third point is important for Scotus' account of God's eternity.
Scotus argues that, for any item x, if x is to be temporal, then it must satisfy one of two conditions: either (i) x is undergoing some real change; or
(ii) x has the capacity for undergoing some real change. 33 God can satisfy neither of these two conditions. God's simplicity entails that God
cannot undergo any substantial or accidental change. Such change
requires that the subject receive a new form: and it is not possible for a
wholly simple being to receive a form. Furthermore, God's necessity
entails that he cannot be annihilated. 34 Since these two cases cover all the
possibilities for change, Scotus infers that God is immutable: and hence a
fortiori unable to satisfy (i) and (ii).
Scotus' position here is open to an objection which I think he can successfully rebut. To understand the objection, we will need an understanding of Scotus' account of relations. Roughly, Scotus adopts a realist
account of real relations, such that the following principle is true:
(F) For any item x and any item y, x is contingently really related
to y, if and only if a relational property R, really distinct from x
and y, inheres in X.3S
Scotus' understanding of accidental properties in general is that they are
properly classified as individual items (res), really distinct from the substance in which they inhere: and as Scotus understands a relational
property, it too is classified as an individual item, really distinct from the
substance in which it inheres. On this account of relations, it will look as
though God could change - and thus be temporal- merely in virtue of
changes in the relations holding between him and creatures.
Scotus replies that God fails to be really related to any of his creatures. God is merely rationally related to his creatures: even though his
creatures are really related - in the relevant respects - to God. A rational relation satisfies the following condition:

x and any item y, x is rationally related to y, if
and only if (a) at least one of x and y is really related to the other
term, and (b) an intellectual agent cognizes this real relation. 36
(G) For any item
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(G) allows that x could be rationally related to y, even if x is not really
related to y. On (G), y's real relation - call it "R" - to x, together with
an intellectual agent's cognition of R, would be jointly sufficient for x's
being rationally related to y. There is thus a subclass of rational relations, which we could conveniently label "merely rational" relations:
(G*) For any item x and any item y, x is merely rationally related
to y, if and only if (a) y is really related to x, (b) it is not the case
that x is really related to y, and (c) an intellectual agent cognizes
the real relation between y and X. 37
Of course, no item could simultaneously satisfy in exactly the same
respect the conditions governing x in both (F) and (G*).
Scotus argues that God instantiates the conditions governing x in
(G*). He reasons that there can be no real relation in God to any other
being:
(H) Nothing in God requires the existence of some item other
than God for its existence;
(I) A real relation requires some item other than itself for its
existence;

therefore
(3) There is no real relation in God to any item other than God. 3D
(3) alone, however, is not sufficient to show that God can satisfy conditions (a) and (c) of (G*), required for a merely rational relation. But
Scotus would claim that condition (a) is satisfied in virtue of the fact that
every creature is necessarily really related to its creator/9 and condition
(c) is satisfied if either God or some other intellectual agent cognizes any
one of the real relations holding between a creature and its creator.4D
Since Scotus accepts (3), he has no trouble accepting that there can be
real, temporally successive relations between creatures and God, without this entailing that there are such real temporally successive relations
between God and creatures. Thus, creatures can be changed such that
there is no corresponding real (relational or non-relational) change in
God. Scotus therefore affirms
(4) There are no real temporally successive relations in God to
any other item,
which he claims is entailed by (3).41 As I will make clear in the final section
of this paper, Scotus' acceptance of (3) leads to certain difficulties in his
account. Accepting (4), however, is wholly unproblematic as far as I can
see, and it is all that Scotus needs to block the objection that God could be
temporal merely in virtue of his changing relations to his creatures.
Scotus' acceptance of (3) does not, however, commit him to the posi-
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tion that God cannot undergo what a modern philosopher would label a
"merely Cambridge" change: one such that different predicates can be
true of an item at different times, even if that item is in every other respect
unchangingY (Scotus would want to clarify: unchanging with regard
both to non-relational features and real relational properties.) God
could undergo a merely Cambridge change just if the following two conditions are satisfied: (a) there is a change in a creature in any respect in
which the creature is really related to God, and (b) some intellectual
agent cognizes this change. Scotus is quick to point out that there is no
difficulty in God's undergoing such changes, if it is the case that the real
relation in a creature to God is cognized by a created (and not an uncreated) intellect. 43 Scotus' reason is that such changes will correspond to
nothing whatever that is really in God. They are changes pertaining
merely to our cognition of the real relations holding between some creature and God. In an important passage, Scotus puts the point as follows:
"God begot [his Son]" consignifies the "now" of eternity, such
that the sense is "God has the act of generation in the 'now' of
eternity in so far as that 'now' coexisted with the past"; and
"God begets" means "has the act of generation in the 'now' of
eternity in so far as it coexists with the present." Thus, since the
"now" [of eternity] truly coexists with any difference of time, we
can truly predicate of God the differences of all times. 44
When we refer to God using tensed propositions, then, we are drawing
attention to the fact that the proposition "God exists" (tenseless) is
always true. But we are not committed to holding that God is in any
way temporal. On the account, present becomes past, and real relations
in creatures to God come into existence and pass out of existence, with
no corresponding real change in God.
I have tried to show in this section that Scotus holds that God is timeless in virtue of failing to satisfy either of temporality conditions (0 and
(ii) given on p. 9 above, where timelessness entails lacking both temporal extension and succession. I therefore reject Craig's claim that Scotus
construes "eternal" to mean merely "everlasting." In the next section, I
will try to show that Scotus' standard position on timelessness is very
similar to the Thomist account, and that Scotus' standard position is
inconsistent with both (A'.l) and (A'.2).

III. The rejection of (A'.I) and (A'.2) in Scotus' standard account
Granted that Scotus' God is timeless, we can sensibly raise two relevant questions about his account: (i) Does God's timelessness, as construed by Scotus, entail collapsing past and future into the present? (ij)
Does God's timelessness, as construed by Scotus, entail a B-theory of
time? I will argue that Scotus' standard account of divine timelessness
allows him to give a negative answer to the first of these questions, but
not to the second.
In book I, distinction 13 of both the Lectura and the Ordinatio, Scotus
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considers an objection to timelessness which looks remarkably like his
own (A'.l):
When two things are compared to a third ... their union to each
other follows from their union in the third thing .... I am with
eternity, and Abraham was with eternity. Therefore I am simultaneous with Abraham. 4s
Scotus argues that the premisses do not entail the conclusion, on the
grounds that the first premiss, which entails the transitivity and symmetry of simultaneity, is untrue if the third relatum is limitless.'6 And the
discussion above has made it clear that, according to Scotus, eternity
instantiates limitlessness. In employing this argument, Scotus effectively rejects his own (A'.I) against Aquinas. Specifically, he would reject
the crucial
(B*) If x is present to y, then both x and yare present.
(The relation of being "present to" in [B*] means that the presence of tl
and t2 to God, or God's simultaneity with them, will entail that tl and tz
are simultaneous. Hence my conclusion that Scotus' argument here
entails rejecting [B*].) Thus, Scotus standardly accepts Aquinas's
(A) All temporal things are eternally present to God,
but rejects (B*). Now, if Scotus rejects (B*), he will have a plausible way
of blocking the inference from (A) to the rejection of
(C*) It is not the case that the whole of flowing time is present.
This amounts to the claim that, even if we accept (A), we do not need to
accept the contradictory of (C*),
(1) All things are temporally present.

We might summarize this account by claiming that all temporal things are
present to eternity without it following that they are temporally present.
Scotus' solution, which is that God's limitlessness prevents Scotus'
being simultaneous with Abraham, has some similarity with the most
famous modern attempt to sidestep (A/.I): Stump and Kretzmann's ETsimultaneity.47 ET-simultaneity is the kind of relation of simultaneity
which obtains between two items such that one is eternal and the other
is temporal. ET-simultaneity is a different kind of relation from the ordinary kind of simultaneity which obtains between two temporal items
(labeled by Stump and Kretzmann "T-simultaneity"):48 thus, on Stump
and Kretzmann's account, the ET-simultaneity of both Abraham and
Scotus with God will not entail that Abraham and Scotus are T-simultaneous. It is not clear to me just what ET-simultaneity amounts to: but
the crucial analogy with Scotus' position is that on both positions God's
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eternity is sufficient to block the inference from the simultaneity of all
temporal items with God to the simultaneity of all temporal items with
each other. Scotus' argument here offers some kind of way for both him
and Aquinas to block (A'.t). Offering this way, I take it, means that
Scotus' position represents a small improvement on the Thomist
account.
In his standard account, then, Scotus rejects (A'.I). Since Scotus'
rejection of (A'.I) entails rejecting (1), Scotus' standard account also
means, unsurprisingly, that he reject (A'.2). According to (A'.2), the falsity of (1) will entail the falsity of (A). Scotus' standard account, however, both rejects (1) and retains (A). We can see how Scotus rejects (A'.2)
if we look at what he has to say about God's knowledge of future events.
Scotus sets up the problem by looking at the following scenario.
Suppose some rational relation exists in God to his creatures in virtue of
the divine intellect's cognition of the real relations between creatures
and God. Since these real relations are, as a matter of contingent fact,
constantly changing as creatures come into existence and pass out of
existence, will it not be the case that God's knowledge of his creatures is
always changing? Scotus argues that it will not:
Just as [God] in eternity compares his will "as creative" to the
soul of the Antichrist as possible for some time, so he in eternity
compares his will "as creating" to the soul of the Antichrist as
actually existing at that instant for which he wills to create that
soul. And these are two rational relations. 49
Before providing an assessment of the claims made in this passage, it is
worth looking a little more closely at Scotus' account of God's knowledge of his creatures. Basically, Scotus argues that God's knowledge of
a creature will involve a real relation in the creature to God, and a merely rational relation in God to the creature. The rational relation in God is
described by Scotus as God's comparing himself in some way to the cognized creature. 50 Now, on this showing it is quite clear that the passage
just quoted will entail that God has timeless knowledge of future events
in their actual existence, and that God can compare himself to these
future events. The important point in this account is that there is a
meaningful sense in which future events and substances have actual
existence.
In the passage, Scotus claims that God has two separate divinely
caused rational relations, one corresponding to the Antichrist as actually
existing at t, and another corresponding to the Antichrist as potentially
existing at t -n. Scotus makes much the same point in a (failed) attempt to
deal with the problem of God's knowledge of temporal indexicals:
God can know himself to be creating a stone at [a time] a; but he
cannot have any new knowledge that he is creating the stone.
Rather, he knows in eternity that he creates the stone at a, just as
he knows in eternity that, for some time, he is creative of a
stone. In other words, he knows in eternity his actual relation to
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[the stone] at a, just as he also knows his quasi-potential rational
relation to [the stone] at some [other] time. 51

In this passage, God's actual relation to the stone at t is, of course, a
rational relation. (The relevant term contradictory to "actual" here is
"quasi-potential," not "rational," as the passage makes clear.) Again,
the point is that God can have timeless knowledge of his essence compared to some creature in its actual existence, whether or not that creature is now future.
Scotus invests some importance in his claim that God must have two
separate timeless rational relations to his creatures: an actual rational
relation to the creature as actually existent, and a "quasi-potential" rational relation to the creature considered as a future existent. 52 Accepting

(J) Divinely caused rational relations in God to a creature necessarily correspond on a one to one basis with real relations
between creatures and God,

Scotus reasons that, if God does not have two such separate rational
relations, then there cannot be two distinct real relations in the creature
to God: one at tn of being created in the future, and one at t of being
actually created. But if there are not two such distinct real relations,
Scotus reasons, then there can be no new real relations between a creature and God. 53 Presumably, Scotus is imagining that, on the proposed
scenario, there would be no way of building a tense component into the
actual existence of some item. Thus, for example, Scotus wants to claim
that, unless there exists in the Antichrist both (i) a real relation at tn to
God of being created in the future, and (ii) a real relation at t to God of
being actually created, then it will not be possible to claim that the
Antichrist exists at t, but not at t _n. 54 It is admittedly difficult to see why
this should be so. But the important point to note is that, on this
account, God can have a timeless rational relation to a creature in its
actual existence (by comparing his essence to that creature in its actual
existence), even if, like the Antichrist, the existence of such a creature is
now future. 55 Thus, Scotus accepts:
(K) For any creature c, God can have a timeless rational relation
to c in its actual existence at t,
(supposing as a matter of contingent fact that c begins to exist at t). But
the discussion makes it clear that Scotus also accepts the related principle
(L) For any creature c, God can have a timeless rational relation
to c in its potential existence at t -n

(again supposing as a matter of contingent fact that c begins to exist at t).
(K) and (L) are not contradictories, because of the temporal component
built in to the existence of c. (K) entails the falsity of
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(0) Only temporally present things are actual,
which Scotus should therefore replace with
(0') It is timelessly the case that all things, past, present and
future, are actual.
(L) entails that Scotus also accept

(L *) It is timelessly the case that all things, past, present and
future, are potential.
(0') and (L *) are not contradictories, since implicit in each, as understood by
Scotus, is a different set of temporal components. For example, the following principle is true on this account, and consistent with both (0') and (L*):

(0*) It is timelessly the case that (i) the past is potential at to and
actual at h, (ii) the present is potential at to and tl, and actual at h,
and (iii) the future is potential at to, tJ and h, and actual at h
(where to is earlier than tl, h is earlier than t2, and tz is earlier than to).
(0*) brings out a clear distinction which Scotus makes between actuality
and temporal presence: an item can be actual without being (now) present. I will return to this distinction in my conclusion.
This discussion allows us to provide the positive answer to our second question, Does God's timelessness, as construed by Scotus, entail a
B-theory of time? On a B-theory of time, past, present and future are all
ontologically on a par with each other. The ontological parity of past,
present and future is clearly suggested by (0*), which is entailed by (K)
and (L) on Scotus' understanding. According to (0*), past, present and
future are all actual in just the same respect, and potential in just the
same respect. Scotus is therefore committed to a B-theory of time. Since
he rejects (0), he will clearly have to abandon (A'.2). But (K) allows
Scotus to adopt something like Aquinas' position on God's knowledge
of creatures in their actual existence, even if those creatures are now
future. Thus (K) does not mean that God's knowledge of his creatures in
their actual existence entails that they are all, irrespective of their temporallocation, now present. Scotus' rejection of (A'.2) is therefore wholly
consistent with his rejection of (A'.1).
Scotus' preferred account of God's presence to his creatures is spelled
out in terms of coexistence. God coexists with his (temporal) creatures.
The relation, as Scotus crucially points out, is merely rationaP6 As such,
it is not properly transitive or symmetrical at all. The reason for this is
that a merely rational relation between God and a creature c requires
both that c is really related to God, and that God is not really related to c.
It thus does not entail rejecting (C*), or accepting (1). Let me quote in
full a passage part of which I quoted above:
What do these temporally diverse words signify when we predi-

Faith and Philosophy

16

cate them of God? I reply that they can be more properly said to
consignify the "now" of eternity than differences of time.
Neither [do they signify] that "now" absolutely, since then there
would not be a variation in the diverse modes of signifying
time. Rather, [they consignify the "now" of eternity] in so far as
it coexists with the parts of time. For example, "God begot [his
Son]" consignifies the "now" of eternity, such that the sense is
"God has the act of generation in the 'now' of eternity in so far
as that 'now' coexisted with the past"; and "God begets" means
"has the act of generation in the 'now' of eternity in so far as it
coexists with the present." Thus, since the "now" [of eternity]
truly coexists with any difference of time, we can truly predicate
of God the differences of all times. 57
The passage makes it clear that there is real temporal succession in creatures. But a timeless God coexists with his creatures just if it is the case
both that there are real relations between creatures and God, and that
there exist intellectual agents (e.g., God) actually cognizing these relations. This second condition is required to satisfy Scotus' claim, just
noted, that coexistence is a merely rational relation. (God's own cognition is, as made clear above, timeless, entailing the actual existence
[though not temporal presence] of the cognized real relations.) On this
account, God coexists with his creatures just if it is the case that some
intellectual agent cognizes the actual (though not necessarily temporally
present) real relations between creatures and God.
On the other hand, Scotus' concept of coexistence does not have the
same explanatory value as that of presence or simultaneity. We can use
the idea that all of time is present to God to explain how God can have
knowledge of all of time: God can know all of time since all of time is
present to him, or simultaneous with him. Scotus' concept of God's coexistence with his creatures cannot explain how God has knowledge of all
of time. Granted that creatures have real relations to God, God coexists
with creatures if and only if one of two conditions is satisfied: either (a)
God compares his essence to these real relations, or (b) a created intellect
compares God's essence to these real relations. But neither of these conditions can possibly explain how God (or indeed a creature) is able to
perform the relevant cognitive task. Perhaps Scotus should appeal to his
standard argument against (A /.l), according to which all time is simultaneous with God, to explain how God can perform the relevant cognitive
task. Indeed, his standard argument against (A' .1) will allow him to
claim that only God can perform the relevant task with regard to past
and future items, since only God has the relevant access (mediated via
the simultaneity of all time to God) to past and future items.

IV. Conclusion
In section 2 of this paper, I attempted to argue against Craig that
Scotus' God is timeless. In addition to showing that Scotus has a clear
conception of divine timelessness, I tried to show what is distinctive in
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his account. I tried to show that Scotus has a clear conception of the
topological properties which timelessness will exhibit, and that central
to Scotus' defense of God's timelessness is God's failure to be really
related to any of his creatures.
In section 3, I argued further that Scotus' rejection of Aquinas'
account, in book I, distinction 39 of the Lectura, needs to be treated with
caution, since there is good reason to suppose that in his standard
account Scotus rejects the two Lectura arguments. He rejects (A'.1) since
he rejects
(B*) If x is present to y, then both x and yare present;
and he rejects (A'.2) since he rejects
(D) Only temporally present things are actual.
Accepting (D') and (L *) in place of (D) will allow Scotus to affirm that
future existents can be known in their actual existence: though at the
expense of committing Scotus to a B-theory of time. I thus reject Adams'
claim, made on the basis of (A'.2), that Scotus' ontology of time avoids
his being a B-theorist. But Scotus still consistently rejects
(1) All things are temporally present.

Thus, his commitment to a B-theory of time does not entail collapsing
the past and future into the present.
This does not mean, of course, that there are not problems with the
account, even in terms of its internal coherence. Crucially, there seem to
me to be two related difficulties which Scotus does not overcome. The
first is his clear commitment to the claim that God's knowledge of his
creatures according to their actual existence fails to be a real relation in
God. We would normally think of x's knowledge of y as involving at
least a relation in x (howsoever a relation is conceived). Scotus, indeed,
standardly agrees with this description of knowledge. 58 Thus, I do not
see how God could have knowledge of his creatures without thereby
being really related to them.
Scotus' reason for denying that God, in cognizing his creatures, is
really related to them is that he accepts the general principle
(H) Nothing in God requires the existence of some item other
than God for its existence.
But accepting (H) seems to me to lead to a second problem in Scotus'
account. The problem is that for God to have knowledge of his actually
existing creatures, it is necessary that his creatures actually exist (though
not, of course, that they actually exist now). Thus, the actual existence of
his creatures is a necessary condition for God's having knowledge of
them. 59 And this violates (H). How important this will be for us will
depend on the strength of our commitment to (H). But (H) is clearly
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important for Scotus. Since, as Scotus construes relations, it is the case that
(M) Any item requiring the existence of some item other than
itself is either (a) a real relation, or (b) really (though not formally) identical with a real relation/o

the falsity of (H), entailed by the account of God's knowledge which I
have just outlined, will entail that Scotus' central claim
(3) There is no real relation in God to any item other than God
is false. It is for this reason that I regard Scotus' acceptance of (3) as
problematic. But the truth of (3) is not necessary for the truth of
(4) There are no real temporally successive relations between
God and his creatures,
since a God really related to his creatures in a certain respect (e.g.,
knowledge) need not satisfy either of the temporality conditions (i) or
(ii) outlined in section 2 of this paper. Equally, the benefits of abandoning (H), and hence (3), easily outweigh the sacrifices which have to be
made by retaining it. I would judge, then, that Scotus should abandon
both of these claims.
Does Scotus' account have anything to offer to us today? I would argue
that it appears to be a fairly clear account of timelessness, and that it is perhaps the earliest account to provide a suitable reply to the kind of objection
found to Aquinas' (and Scotus' standard) account in both Kenny and Scotus'
own (A'.I). As we find the account of timelessness in Scotus, it depends on
Scotus' acceptance of (3), a proposition which many today would find unappealing. But if we adopt the modifications to Scotus' account proposed in
the final section of my paper, the account will no longer entail (3), since on
my proposed modifications what is at issue is just God's knowledge of his
creatures: and we can have an account of such knowledge independent of
our acceptance or rejection of (3). To allow for timelessness, all we need to
posit is that God's knowledge is changeless: not that God has no real properties contingent upon the existence of his creatures.
Scotus' distinction between actuality and temporal presence (such
that past and future can be actual without this entailing that they are
now present) has a parallel in a suggestion made by a modern philosopher, which indicates that it·might still have some mileage in it.
Aristotle's first argument in favor of the claim that time "does not exist
at all, or hardly and obscurely,"M is that time is composed of merely past
and future, where the past has been and gone (and hence does not exist),
and the future is still to be (and hence does not exist).62 Richard Sorabji
suggests the following response to the argument:
It is only in the irrelevant sense of being present that the past and

future do not exist. In the sense that matters, there is a past and
there is a future, and so there is time. 63
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In this response, Sorabji apparently capitalizes on a distinction between
existence and presence which bears a striking resemblance to Scotus'
contrast between actuality and temporal presence. This distinction
allows Scotus' B-theory of time to avoid collapsing past and future into
the present. Equally, his standard objection to (A'.l) is a striking anticipation of Stump and Kretzmann's ET-simultaneity, and provides I think
a good example of Scotus' insight into a perennial and engaging problem in the philosophy of religion - whatever we might think of his (and
Stump and Kretzmann's) proposed replies.
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not know himself to be creating that stone in the way that a created intellect
could know him (when he is creating [the stone]), to be creating the stone
now. But the consequent is wrong, since whatever we can know, [God] can
know much more" ("Si nulla potest esse relatio nova in Deo per actum intellectus sui, ergo si ... Deus posset creare lap idem, non posset intelligere se
creantem lapidem, sicut intellectus creatus potest intelligere ipsum modo
creantem lapidem, quando ipsum creat; consequens videtur inconveniens,
quia quidquid est cognoscibile a nobis, multo magis et ab ipso"): Ord. 1.30.12, n. 42 (6:188). That Scotus should see the need to raise this objection is
strong evidence in favor of the claim that Scotus' God is timeless and knows
things timelessly: and his failure to give a satisfactory reply is even stronger
evidence. Scotus replies in terms merely of God's knowledge of the B-series,
which is hardly problematic for a defender of divine timelessness.
52. Elsewhere, Scotus calls the quasi-potential rational relation an "aptitudinal" relation (see Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 15 [6:174]).
53. Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 15 (6:174). Accepting (J) looks to be inconsistent with
Scotus' claim, discussed in note 50 above, that God could in principle have
knowledge of a creature (such that there would be a real relation in the creature to God) without there being a corresponding rational relation in God. I
do not know how to reconcile these two Scotist claims.
54. Scotus takes this view against Henry of Ghent, who holds
(J*) Divinely caused rational relations in God to a creature necessarily correspond on a one to one basis with God's creative actions.

On (J*), if there is just one divine action with regard to a creature e, there
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will be just one rational relation between God and c. Using the example of
the Antichrist, Henry would argue that there is just one divinely caused
rational relation in God to the Antichrist, since there is just one creative act
bringing it about that the Antichrist exists (Henry of Ghent, Quod. 9.1 ad 1
[pp. 13-14]; see Scotus, Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 11 [6:172]). One advantage of Scotus'
position is that it allows God to have some kind of knowledge of the truth
values of tensed propositions. This is because, on Scotus' account, God will
be able to compare his essence to two different real creaturely relations.
Thus, supposing that the Antichrist begins to exist at some time t, Scotus
argues what is known by God in (y) and (3) represent two separate items of
knowledge:
(y)

God knows that "the Antichrist exists" is true at t;

(3) God knows that "the Antichrist will exist" is true at t-=!I.
On the other hand, although Scotus' odd position here is sufficient to
allow that (y) and (3) fail to be synonymous, it is easy to imagine more economical theories which could allow for this.
55. Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 15 (6:172); see Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 41 (6:186-88).
56. Quod. 6, n. 15 (12:150); Alluntis and Wolter, p. 142 (par. 6.35).
57. "Sed quid significant ista verba diversorum temporum, cum dicuntur de Deo? - Respondeo. Magis proprie possunt dici consignificare 'nunc'
aeternitatis quam differentias temporis; nec tamen illud 'nunc' absolute,
quia non esset tunc variatio modorum diversorum temporis significandi sed
in quantum coexsistit partibus temporis, ut cum dicitur: 'Deus genuit,' consignificatur 'nunc' aeternitatis, ut sit sensus, Deus habet actum generationis
in 'nunc' aeternitatis in quantum illud 'nunc' coexsistebat praeterito, 'Deus generat,' hoc est habet actum generationis in 'nunc' aeternitatis in
quantum coexsistit praesenti. Ex hoc patet quod cum illud 'nunc' vere coexsistat cuilibet differentiae temporis, vere dicimus de Deo differentias omnium temporum": Ord. 1.9.un., n. 17 (4:336-37). The version of (A'.I) found in
Ord. 1.39.1-5, n. 9 (6:409) blurs the distinction between presence and coexistence, and crucially claims both that coexistence is a real relation and that
God does not coexist with his creatures: "Aeternitas non erit ratio coexsistendi alicui nisi existendi." This doctrine is decidedly un-Scotist, and seems
to me clear evidence in favor of the unauthenticity of the text at this point.
58. Quod. 13, n. 11 (12:311); Alluntis and Wolter, p. 292 (par. 13.34).
59. In his discussions of God's knowledge, Scotus does not seem to
notice this. He consistently claims that God's knowledge of his creatures is
logically and causally prior to the existence of these creatures, and thus that
it is unaffected by the existence of his creatures (see for example Ord. 1.2.1.12, nn. 105, 107-08 [2:187-88]; English translation in Duns Scotus, Philosophical
Writings, ed. Allan B. Wolter [Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1987],
pp. 60-61). Even supposing that God's knowledge is causally prior to his
creatures, my second objection will stand.
60. Scotus consistently distinguishes between relational and absolute
items. A relational item - i.e., a relation - is "a condition 'toward another'" (Ord. 2.1.4-5, textus interpolatus [7:122]; see also Henninger, Relations, p.
83, n. 40, and the texts cited there). This covers the first disjunct in (M). An
absolute item is distinguished from a relation in virtue of the fact that the
ratio of an absolute item does not include reference to any other item. Scotus
argues, however, that all created absolute items necessarily depend on God.
Since they cannot exist without this dependence, they are really identical
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with it (Scotus accepts that separability is a necessary and sufficient condition for real distinction: see Ord. 2.1.5, nn. 200-04 [7:101-03]). But the creature and its dependence relation are formally or definition ally distinct, since
dependence on God is not a defining feature of any creature (Ord. 2.1.4-5, nn.
272-75 [7:135-361; see also Henninger, Relations, pp. 78-85). This covers the
second disjunct in (M). The disjunction in (M) is exhaustive, since Scotus
defines an absolute item as one which does not require any other item for its
existence (Ord. 2.1.4-5, textus interpolatus [7:122]). An act of knowledge is not
formally a relative item. It does, however, require a relation in itself to its
object for its existence (Quod. 13, nn. 3-5, [12:302-031; Alluntis and Wolter,
pp. 285-87 [par. 13.8-13.16]). It is thus an instance of the second disjunct in
(M) (Quod. 13, nn. 8, 11 [12:309, 3111; Alluntis and Wolter, pp. 290, 292 [par.
13.27, 13.34]).
61. Physics 4.10 (217b32).
62. Physics 4.10 (217b33-218a3).
63. Richard Sora bji, Time, Creation and the Continuum. Theories in
Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 13: my
italics.

